No user the kernel dropped support for the hardware. They probably fucked up something, (((by accident))), for the gpu since I should be a good nigger a buy a new computer every 5 years to fucking use xterm.
Build Linux Kernel 5.1.2
Samuel Rivera
Cooper Watson
The Cluster explosion wasn't caused by a use after free you LARPer.
Benjamin Hernandez
No, that was just the rocket designers being retarded. tl;dr they reused code designed for an older and slower rocket which made assumptions about its maximum inertia, assumed anything higher was a sign of hardware failure, and disabled security features to increase performance. They skimped on basic tests to save money and, surprise surprise, the performance hacks didn't scale up to a faster rocket and led to both redundant computers shutting down mid-flight.
The software for the Inertial Reference System (IRS) on the Ariane 5 was identical to thesoftware used successfully on the Ariane 4 rocket. Basically, the developers took an "OffThe Shelf" part (the IRS) that consisted of hardware and software, the design of which wasused successfully on the Ariane 4 project, and bolted it onto the Ariane 5 rocketcompletely untested. The Ariane 5 rocket had a substantially different flight profile than theAriane 4 was capable of. When the rocket started its flight, it moved at angles that weresubstantially larger than the Ariane 4 flight path would generate. The inertial data exceededthe range limits of the Ariane 4 software.The system was designed with a dual-redundant computer (two processor boards that areidentical, running identical software.) One part of the software in question was performingcalculations on the inertial data and needed to do so repeatedly in a very small amount oftime. The original designers needed to speed up the software so they performed ananalysis of the incoming data and concluded that within the Ariane 4 flight profile, numbersoutside of a certain range would never occur. If such numbers *did* occur, it would be mostlikely that a sensor had failed and was generating wildly out of range data. Hence, it wassafe to remove any error-handling code and instead design in Failure Detection andAccommodation (FDA) logic.The logic went something like this: "If a number comes in over a certain size, it will triggera hardware overflow condition. The hardware will trap to an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR)for handling of that condition. The ISR presumes that if it was reached, then there must bea hardware fault. In the event of a hardware fault, the software will shut down the computerand transfer to the 'spare' ccomputer - which is why we have a 'spare' in the first place."All of this makes sense because the flight path of the Ariane 4 would never generatenumbers large enough to cause an overflow - unless the hardware was broke. The wholeanalysis and design was in place, tested and flew successfully for the Ariane 4 rocket.Now comes the bad part: The design team for the Ariane 5 looked at the IRS for the Ariane4 and figured that they had a reliable piece of hardware that would work fine for the Ariane 5and they could save money by reusing an existing design. That's what they did. Only theystarted to make unwarranted assumptions - that the unit would work on the Ariane 5 flighttrajectory and that it didn't need to be tested in any way against the flight path expected.(Thus saving more money.) Had they run even the most rudimentary tests of the unitagainst the expected flight path of the Ariane 5, they would have triggered the conditionand detected that they had a problem. They never did.When the rocket flew for the first time, both dual-redundant computers detected theoverflow condition. Both presumed that the cause was a hardware failure. Both shut down inan attempt to leave the other side in control. They did *exactly* what they were designed todo and in that sense behaved flawlessly.The fact that the computers in question were programmed in Ada had absolutely nothing todo with the reasons for the crash. It had no more to do with the crash than the fact that bothcomputers were using a Mil-Std-1750a microprocessor - a computer that has been usedreliably in numerous space applications. The original software designers were not to blameeither. They designed their software logic for the problem at hand and had to work within theCPU time limitations they were given. Their FDA logic was *perfect* for the Arriane 4 rocket.The fault lay with the designers of the Ariane 5 and their failure to test their assumptions. Itwould be analogous to taking a tire that was designed to work on a Corvette and "reusing"it in the design of a Freightliner truck. It works *fine* when the only weight it has to support isa Corvette sports car. What would it likely do trying to support the weight of a Freightlinertruck?
Caleb Jones
Carter Garcia
based
Angel Nelson
Why would you wish this on anyone?