Do you trust waterfox?

Basado y rojo pastilleado nojoda

Literally advocating security through obscurity
except that the exit node cannot know the IP of the origin to even do that. Also YOU select the exit node. It is not assigned to you. You have to know the list of exit nodes to select one. Having the tor foundation assign all the routes would be incredibly insecure. Even if it COULD be done I would just fire up a VPN that has all the countries to scrape. It would be done by one company that would publish the list.
except that is not how canvas fingerprinting works.

Or a way to switch between them often.
For example, deleting the VPS running the exit node and spinning up a new instance might get you a new IP with the same monthly expenses than a fixed IP. I'm pretty sure that could be automated with some VPS providers.

Oh another note. The IP would be from a data center ASN. Not an ISP ASN. This makes it incredibly clear the user is either a bot or using a VPN. This is easy to check and the list is public.

They are fine with this, they use captchas and limits to how IPs each client can get to discourage scraping bridges from BridgeDB.
All informational security is security through information asymmetries (for example someone knowing a password and someone else not, or in this case an IP).
I admit it's a feature that seems to be hard or impossible to implement without weakening the anonymization in some way. But think about it this way, it's better to be able to use websites like 8ch.net with weakened anonymity, than using a (((VPN))), barebacking, or not being able to use them at all, since most people (me included) will choose to use it in a shitty non anonymous at all way rather than leave. Maybe you could make the entry nodes add a flag to the following nodes that identifies the origin as belonging to one out of a number of sets of IP addresses, designed in a way so that each group contains an equal amount of people, trying to make it so belonging to a group doesn't reveal too much information about the owner of that IP address. And you could make the nodes relaying that flag optional, depending on if the client wants to use those "secret" Tor exit nodes.
I don't see why it has to be this way. If you're worried about the nodes given to a pre-exit node revealing information about what the pre-exit node was just by knowing the exit node, then make the clients that chose to use this subset of secret nodes request a 4 relay path instead of the default 3.
Yes.
Yeah, all the stuff I said that could be done would help prevent against this. If you don't think those help, then you also must think BridgeDB is useless, since it uses a lot of the same methods I proposed.
Maybe, or maybe there isn't the economic incentive to go through all the trouble to circumvent those measures just to prevent Tor posters.
Even if it was done, the list would probably be behind a paywall, which would discourage a lot of would-be blockers.

Then how does canvas fingerprinting work, according to you?

why do those nigger companies maintain the lists for free and even give free access to apis that let faggots use the service to make accessing something harder. they should at least make the api a feature that costs money.

Good browsers 2019:
luakit
brave
especially luakit

OK retard

By actually rendering to the canvas, reading the result, to detect differences in how the GPU itself handles things.

Oh god no company has ever published anything for free this is simply impossible no one would ever do that. It's not like there are free commercial geolocation data sets or anything.

Wow faggot this is unbelievably stupid. The search space of a good password is bigger than is physically possible to brute force given all the energy in the entire universe. Totally different than opening a tor connection a few thousand times.