Gov Spyware

Bumplocked for QTDDTOT.

Just trash all of it bro. Windows is privacy nightmare.
gnu.org/proprietary/malware-microsoft.html

there's already a Computer Security OPSEC thread AND a QTDDTOT you worthless fucking niggerfaggot
>>>/cuckchan/

HIDE SAGE REPORT REPORT REPORT

They're eventually phasing out 3g cellular service, though, I suppose they could still use their mobile "Stingray" fake towers after that.

Has anyone actually tested to see if the (((chips))) are TXing on the "UMTS frequency (3g) bands"?

what's with all the bumplocked threads…i-is the roach back?

You know this crap belongs in Zig Forums you useless cunt.

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I've used duckduckgo for a while and only the script that pops up is from duckduckgo. Is it still not safe to use and why exactly?

duckduckgo is pretty much google 2.0 since it uses google algorithms. I will sometimes use it to watch videos but hooktube serves the same purpose and I like the UI on hooktube better. you should get used to using searx.me; it has built-in archiving and proxies which is very nice and you can select which search engines it utilizes to complete a search and there are a lot of options to choose from. seriously, duckduckgo is shit, use searx.me

see the gif i attached? the only way you can be safe and have certainty that your shit is secure is to do exactly the same as Ewen MacAskill was forced to do by GCHQ and drill holes in all of the chips on the mainboard and hard drives of his laptop, which he took to Honk Kong when he met Snowden and which he used to store his copy, being one of the Three Bearers of the Fellowship of the Snowden Cache.

do you think you can outsmart NSA TAO IRATEMONK, which is a virus that infects the firmware of the top dozen of so Original Equipment Manufacturers of the most common and popular hard disk drives on the consumer market?

oh wait, das rite, you're a wise guy, you know how to invent your own cryptographically secure radio packet protocol so that you
don't have to use WiFi and get hacked to shit by NSA TAO's NIGHTSTAND WiFi exploitation suitcase that can watch your dick pix over the air from 8 miles away–in an ideal radio spectrum environment which is flat and quiet and low interference.

excuse moi, i didn't realize you were the fucking Predator from another galaxy cloaked with an invisibility suit, so you'll have no problems being like a ghost when NSA TAO whips out its CTX4000 Radar Retroreflector suitcase and illuminates your fucking bedroom from a white surveillance van parked 3 blocks away, and then the LOUDAUTO or TAWDRYYARD or PHOTOGLOW rf reflectors which are smaller than your pinky nail and which were glued behind the drywall in your bedroom by NSA SSO blag bagmen who hamburgled your bubba gump fucking ass one day when you left to run an errand to buy more Soylent. now those rf reflectors constructively interfere with the carrier wave beamed from the suitcase in the van and NSA have full audio and HD video of your bedroom and you while you jackit to lolis on your computer.

see where i'm going with this?

if you're worried about NSA or the Federales bugging your box or wiretapping your phones, there ain't shit you can do to stop them. so-called Technical Surveillance Counter Measures are a fucking scam against the type of shit NSA got to count the number of turds you plunk from space.

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duckduckgo sells you data, they even said such. Can't find image, I think I may have lost it.

lets not become ultra paranoid there buddy.
Such spying methods require a shitload of resources and are targeted at a single person.
If you are targeted like that and dont have an armed 200+men militia behind you to storm major objectives next day, you are fucked.
I have no clue how Snowden and Assange are still alive.

I am talking about conventional datacollector surveillance software. That is supposed to automaticly find suspects. Which may lead to simple arrest. I am not some evil genius planing to take over the world….

how is ghostery part of a botnet?

Shit's been backdoored since way before 2011.

Soldering iron (also good for cameras and mics). Homemade or store bought faraday cages, bags, boxes fail.

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Never hurts to discuss the possibilities inherent in leaving the internet. Amish are slow to adopt our tech, and maybe that’s a good strategy. Then again, machine learning and possible future ai. Do we still live in a world where we can retain the former innocence? Is there a means of self-defense that doesn’t involve drinking the poison, so to speak? Not to be meta, but often times these threads don’t seem to go far enough, or they permit a false sense of security by suggesting that computers are safe so long as you install gentoo on homebrew hardware.

you stupid nigger. you are so crippled and retarded by your encephalitis that your frisbee shaped skull is incapable of comprehending the Snowden leaks.

it is beyond question that NSA, GCHQ and the FVEYs are monitoring 100% of Internet traffic and analyzing all of it to identify who every "event" belongs to, and where you are, and where you go, and who you know.

you cease to deserve any human rights the moment you poo-poo and discount and ignore and hand-wave away the legitimate populist outrage which is a consequence of Snowden's evidence that everyone is being spied on at all times on an astronomical scale.

you should be locked into a 6x3 foot wide steel cage and then sprayed with kerosine and then lit on fire.

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Abstract. This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. Using an innovative patented technique we were able to detect and analyse in the first documented case of its kind, a backdoor inserted into the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips. The backdoor was found to exist on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. Using Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA), a technique pioneered by our sponsor, we were able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor. This way an attacker can disable all the security on the chip, reprogram crypto and access keys, modify low-level silicon features, access unencrypted configuration bitstream or permanently damage the device. Clearly this means the device is wide open to intellectual property theft, fraud, re-programming as well as reverse engineering of the design which allows the introduction of a new backdoor or Trojan. Most concerning, it is not possible to patch the backdoor in chips already deployed, meaning those using this family of chips have to accept the fact it can be easily compromised or it will have to be physically replaced after a redesign of the silicon itself.

cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/sec_news.html

Current issues. UK officials are fearful that China has the capability to shut down businesses, military and critical infrastructure through cyber attacks and spy equipment embedded in computer and telecommunications equipment. The Stuxnet worm is the most famous and best case example of a cyber attack on a network which wreaked devastation having easily compromised conventional software defensive systems. There have been many cases of computer hardware having backdoors, Trojans or other programs to allow an attacker to gain access or transmit confidential data to a third party. Considerable focus and expense has been invested in software computer networks and system defences to detect and eradicate such threats.
However, similar technology with antivirus or anti Trojan capability for hardware (silicon chips) is not available. The computer or network hardware underpins and runs all the software defence systems. If the hardware has a vulnerability then all the energy in defending at the software level is redundant. An effort must be made to defend and detect at the hardware level for a more comprehensive strategy.
Our findings. Claims were made by the intelligence agencies around the world, from MI5, NSA and IARPA, that silicon chips could be infected. We developed breakthrough silicon chip scanning technology to investigate these claims. We chose an American military chip that is highly secure with sophisticated encryption standard, manufactured in China. Our aim was to perform advanced code breaking and to see if there were any unexpected features on the chip. We scanned the silicon chip in an affordable time and found a previously unknown backdoor inserted by the manufacturer. This backdoor has a key, which we were able to extract. If you use this key you can disable the chip or reprogram it at will, even if locked by the user with their own key. This particular chip is prevalent in many systems from weapons, nuclear power plants to public transport. In other words, this backdoor access could be turned into an advanced Stuxnet weapon to attack potentially millions of systems. The scale and range of possible attacks has huge implications for National Security and public infrastructure.
Key features of our technology:
scans silicon/hardware for backdoors, Trojans and unexpected behaviour
low cost
very fast result turnaround time
high portability
adaptable - scale up to include many types of chip
Further funding is needed for us to progress to testing further silicon chips and to develop better search algorithms which would allow us to detect possible spy systems or vulnerabilities in a greater range of systems.
Currently there is no economical or timely way of ascertaining if a manufacturer's specifications have been altered during the manufacturing process (99% of chips are manufactured in China), or indeed if the specifications themselves contain a deliberately inserted potential threat.
Conclusions. It is clear that cyber attacks will increasingly be of this nature, having most impact; it is imperative that this issue is addressed as a matter of urgency. We would suggest making hardware assurance (HWA) & hardware defence (HWD), the testing of silicon chips for backdoors and Trojans, and their defence, a greater priority within the National Cyber Strategy. Until now it was not possible to perform such analysis in a timely or cost effective manner. Our technology provides a solution. A variation in this technology could be used as a backstop defence on a computer or network system where it can monitor instructions and possible reprogramming or activation of a buried spy system in a real time environment, thereby preventing Stuxnet type attacks.
Further funding is needed for us to progress to testing further silicon chips and to develop better search algorithms which would allow us to detect possible spy systems or vulnerabilities in a greater range of systems.

Abstract. This paper is a short summary of a real world AES key extraction performed on a military grade FPGA marketed as 'virtually unbreakable' and 'highly secure'. We demonstrated that it is possible to extract the AES key from the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chip in a time of 0.01 seconds using a new side-channel analysis technique called Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA). This new technique does not introduce a new form of side-channel attacks (SCA), it introduces a substantially improved method of waveform analysis over conventional attack technology. It could be used to improve upon the speed at which all SCA can be performed, on any device and especially against devices previously thought to be unfeasible to break because of the time and equipment cost. Possessing the AES key for the ProASIC3 would allow an attacker to decrypt the bitstream or authenticate himself as a legitimate user and extract the bitstream from the device where no read back facility exists. This means the device is wide open to intellectual property theft, fraud and reverse engineering of the design to allow the introduction of a backdoor or Trojan. We show that with a very low cost hardware setup made with parts obtained from a local electronics distributor you can improve upon existing SCA up to a factor of x1,000,000 in time and at a fraction of the cost of existing SCA equipment.

cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/AES_in_the_blink_draft.pdf

This is one of the scariest papers I read in a while…

Search Google for 9C5A203A if you want to enter the rabbit hole……

At first I thought that somewhere I was mistaken, I did not understand something, I forgot something. I checked everything up to the last bit in my code, I did not find any mistakes and began to sin not on myself, but on my colleagues because of the hillock.

First of all replaced the processors, but it did not help. On motherboards at that time, the virtualization hardware was only in the BIOS, where it was initialized when the server was turned on, so I started comparing the BIOSes on motherboards (the same type of motherboard with samples) - everything was the same as the byte and the BIOS number itself. I fell into a stupor and, no longer knowing what to do, applied the last resort - the "method of poking." What I did not do, no longer thinking, but simply combining, and in the end stupidly downloaded the bios from the official site of Intel and rewrote them again in the motherboard, after which it all worked …

To my surprise there was no limit: the BIOS number was the same, the images of the BIOS coincided byte by byte, but for some reason the serial motherboards earned only when I filled them with the same bios taken by the Intel site. So, the reason is still in the motherboards? But the only difference was in the marking: samples were written Assembled Canada, and on serial cards - Assembled China. It became clear that the fees from China contain additional software modules, stitched in the BIOS, and the standard analysis programs did not see these modules. They, apparently, also worked with virtualization equipment and, accordingly, had the opportunity to hide the true contents of the BIOS. I became aware of the reason for my hyperdrive hangs on these Chinese boards: two software systems simultaneously worked with the same virtualization equipment, which did not allow me to share my resources. I wanted to deal with this malicious bios, and without any backward thought about "bookmarks", "backdoors", "undocumented opportunities," was just academic interest, and nothing more.
…….
The totality of the facts alarmed and led to paranoid thoughts in the style of spy detectives. These facts unequivocally spoke about the following:

In the new Intel-based serial server boards based on the chipset 5000, there are programs stitched in the flash memory of the IUD unit and executed on the central processor, and these programs work with virtualization hardware from the central processor.
Images of flash memory from the official site of Intel do not contain such software modules, therefore, the software modules interfering with me were illegally stitched into motherboards at the production stage.
The flash memory of the IUD block contains encrypted program modules that can not be collected and poured into flash memory without knowledge of the encryption keys, therefore, the one who inserted these illegal program modules knew the encryption keys, that is, it had virtually access to classified information.

Inside every modern CPU since the Intel Pentium fdiv bug, assembly instructions aren’t a one-to-one mapping to what the CPU actually does. Inside the CPU, there is a decoder that turns assembly into even more primitive instructions that are fed into the CPU’s internal scheduler and pipeline. The code that drives the decoder is the CPU’s microcode, and it lives in ROM that’s normally inaccessible. But microcode patches have been deployed in the past to fix up CPU hardware bugs, so it’s certainly writeable. That’s practically an invitation, right? At least a group from the Ruhr University Bochum took it as such, and started hacking on the microcode in the AMD K8 and K10 processors.

The hurdles to playing around in the microcode are daunting. It turns assembly language into something, but the instruction set that the inner CPU, ALU, et al use was completely unknown. [Philip] walked us through their first line of attack, which was essentially guessing in the dark. First they mapped out where each x86 assembly codes went in microcode ROM. Using this information, and the ability to update the microcode, they could load and execute arbitrary microcode. They still didn’t know anything about the microcode, but they knew how to run it.

So they started uploading random microcode to see what it did. This random microcode crashed almost every time. The rest of the time, there was no difference between the input and output states. But then, after a week of running, a breakthrough: the microcode XOR’ed. From this, they found out the syntax of the command and began to discover more commands through trial and error. Quite late in the game, they went on to take the chip apart and read out the ROM contents with a microscope and OCR software, at least well enough to verify that some of the microcode operations were burned in ROM.

cont. (1/2)

The result was 29 microcode operations including logic, arithmetic, load, and store commands — enough to start writing microcode code. The first microcode programs written helped with further discovery, naturally. But before long, they wrote microcode backdoors that triggered when a given calculation was performed, and stealthy trojans that exfiltrate data encrypted or “undetectably” through introducing faults programmatically into calculations. This means nearly undetectable malware that’s resident inside the CPU. (And you think the Intel Management Engine hacks made you paranoid!)

[Benjamin] then bravely stepped us through the browser-based attack live, first in a debugger where we could verify that their custom microcode was being triggered, and then outside of the debugger where suddenly xcalc popped up. What launched the program? Calculating a particular number on a website from inside an unmodified browser.

He also demonstrated the introduction of a simple mathematical error into the microcode that made an encryption routine fail when another particular multiplication was done. While this may not sound like much, if you paid attention in the talk on revealing keys based on a single infrequent bit error, you’d see that this is essentially a few million times more powerful because the error occurs every time.

The team isn’t done with their microcode explorations, and there’s still a lot more of the command set left to discover. So take this as a proof of concept that nearly completely undetectable trojans could exist in the microcode that runs between the compiled code and the CPU on your machine. But, more playfully, it’s also an invitation to start exploring yourself. It’s not every day that an entirely new frontier in computer hacking is bust open.

github.com/RUB-SysSec/Microcode
media.ccc.de/v/34c3-9058-everything_you_want_to_know_about_x86_microcode_but_might_have_been_afraid_to_ask

So what you are saying is that, Zig Forums-user is considered a serious threat?
Now thats a start.

>Kali
That's the most unsafe Linux distro, user. A lot of security features have been disabled, so that its tools would work better.