There was a gas turbine generating plant in Germany that had its main SCADA controls on the open Web.
Hardly, we've got bombs that spew carbon threads over a targeted substation. Shorts out the HV, lights go out and stay out until the carbon tracks are cleaned off the insulators. The threads burn on, so cleaning is a major PITA, too. We used these babies on Iraq in the early 90's. They're awesome.
Sit upon my huge lap fellow anons and I shall tell you a story… this is all public already
There were at least three versions of Stuxnet. I will call them A, B1, B2. The first version detected by VirusBlokAda was version B1. This set off a search for similar malware and version B2 was quickly found. Both of these were very similar and the payload worked by tampering with certain SCADA programming software projects. The common platform versions B1 and B2 used became known as "tilded" after its characteristic out-of-place file names.
These are the infamous "open Explorer and get 0wn3d" worms that could spread by infesting USB sticks and included not one but two rootkits to hide themselves. A user-mode rootkit hid the package from Explorer while installing the kernel-mode rootkit. These would also copy themselves to any USB sticks inserted into an infected machine and these viruses spread widely, infesting a large chunk of India, which is how VirusBlokAda got their first sample.
Versions B1 and B2 are very similar, so I'll call them B-series. B-series had three payloads, but one of the payloads was defunct. The two functioning payloads tampered with VFD controller programming to cause centrifuges to spin at incorrect speeds while reporting correct operation. The third, seemingly original, payload was incomplete and couldn't be analyzed.
Nearly a year later, while searching through old files that had been uploaded to VirusTotal, version A was discovered. Version A was radically different, with a different platform, but had the complete third payload from B-series, and only that payload. Version A had been meant to operate the centrifuge bypass valves incorrectly, contaminating the high-enriched product with the low-enriched raw material. This was an amazingly subtle attack. Version A had another big difference. It did not spread on USB sticks, but instead only infected machines actually running the targeted PLC software, by embedding itself into the SCADA programming project files. It had been uploaded to VirusTotal from Iran, but had scanned as "clean" at the time.
The discovery of version A allows us to complete the story with a little Zig Forums knowledge. USA glowniggers wrote version A. No question, no one else has that kind of detailed knowledge of uranium enrichment and the patience to pull off planting version A. Version A could only have been planted by giving it to a consultant who was working on the project, or possibly to a consultant who worked on some other project with a consultant who was also working for Iran. It would infect any PLC programming project for the targeted PLCs, but could not spread beyond those computers and did not contain any rootkit at all, instead hiding in plain sight.
Obviously, the fucking yids stole version A, or at least the payload, and were dissatisfied with the slow results, or couldn't understand how it did anything. The yids wrapped it in their own platform, riddled with obvious attribution hints because they're that stupid and arrogant. They set it up to spread widely and probably introduced it into a cyber-cafe near the targeted facility. Of course, since B-series spread widely, it spread across most of India and the arrogant yid fools got caught.
Caught by the rest of the world, anyway. The B-series payloads were incompetently designed as well, and did not take into account rotor inertia when changing VFD speeds. The Iranians would have known that their PLCs were tampered as soon as an "all ok" report came "from" an exploded centrifuge. The version A payload would not leave clues by damaging the facility.
Because the yids are arrogant fools, they just couldn't leave well enough alone and conducted a broad-daylight assassination on the man who was in charge of cleaning Stuxnet out of Iran, just in case anyone still didn't know they were responsible. Apparently that kind of skill is so rare among yids that Mossad thought he was unique? All that happened is more fuel for the ovens and his replacement was assigned a security team.
Stupid. Fucking. Yids.
We could have set them back a year, every year, but noooooooo…
Stupid. Fucking. Yids.