based and redpilled.
also most of the people who talk about muh soviet ethnostate are just Asserites or Seige Nazis who hijack socialism as their own with some 4D chess shit about muh based anti-semitic Stalin
Generic Arguments: The Post
Hunter Cooper
Austin Nelson
There's a book from a O9A Nazi that Stalin was a Nazbol.
amazon.com
Hudson Johnson
update: on page 13 of pdf, yeah you talk about empiricism and how it is reactionary in nature, I'm going to assume you completely address it.
Wyatt Gutierrez
This is not materialism but empiricist idealism in disguise as crude materialism - and it is precisely what was answered by Lenin in Materialism & Empirio-Criticism and PDF related. The problem with empiricism is that as a theory of knowledge it states that all that we know comes from sense-data as something external to us and our praxis, and that our praxis can only be informed by it. For empiricists, qualitatively-new ideas can only come from this sense-data but the sense-data often or almost always justifies itself as having some sort of form which we can already approximate with formal models that have fixed qualities, hence through Ockham's razor we don't need to include such qualities in our scientific models. However, this means going up against the very form of empirical data itself and the various qualitative discontinuities between different forms of data - which correspond with different kinds of matter as FED describes. It is silly to say that reason is caused by chemical processes because no chemical processes can be isolated to explain particular thoughts; it is a useless theory. If everything is mechanical, we can provide a fixed number of qualities which we must already have to be able to explain it all, noting only changes in quantities - or at most, changes in the quantitative mathematical systems that we use to describe them. This breaks down with humans, most obviously due to self-reference: which chemical processes explain the thought of isolating those chemical processes which cause us? And which processes explain the thought of thinking about those processes which supposedly explain the thought of isolating those processes? We are met with an infinity of thoughts. If this isn't enough, some ideas (which FED label as being 'autokinetic') must, in order to avoid a paradoxical situation, keep including themselves iteratively - such as the set of all sets, which must keep on including itself as a set. We require new qualities to extend our models to in order to understand the world, though this is not entirely possible with modelling reason since we are using reason to model itself, which is hopeless if we are to remain within reason as it is given Goedel's incompleteness theroems. Ideas approximating themselves yield themselves plus qualitative changes in themselves (more precisely: determinate negations). Rafiq has said much about this: revleft.space
Jason Long
With given qualities, Darwinian evolution can be modelled very well right up until the times when intra-species architectures of organisation do not correspond with non-rational, 'physiological' changes and despite relatively-scarce changes there, such architectures begin to shift much more rapidly. This is the case with humans, whose social architectures have changed through history as Marx and Engels have described (we have different relations of production and family structures, for example, which have been dominant at different times in our history). With non-rational entities, it is far easier to do it with the only obstacle being that we can't fully-describe real processes of Darwinian evolution to their greatest levels of detail. However, we do know of the primary mechanisms such as genes and epigenetic factors.
Yet all emotion is communicated in Lacan's symbolic order, the order of reason itself. It is simply a less-developed reasoning. Additionally, no, we are not computers which only think in terms of formal logic - how would we have arrived at ideas which qualitatively grow themselves, which is impossible in formal logic? Note that when I say 'invariance' in this context, I am talking about a sort of independence from other kinds of thought. Philosophy decoupled morals from God and tied it to rational discussion involving ideas and empirical data which we develop and collect - otherwise, we would be caught in discussions about whether we may know the mind of God or not. Sciences decoupled empirical observations (from which we form morals) from philosophical scepticism and idealism. However, that does not mean that philosophies and sciences are static or that we finish with sciences. They may also operate on themselves as systems of ideas and then produce something qualitatively-more than themselves (FED labels such 'sciences of sciences' as 'psychohistories'). Marx decouples human thought from it being thrown into the abyss of being declared 'unknowable', for only as analysing it as something distinct from other kinds of objective material process can we make it knowable to us.
Ugh. That's not what I've been saying at all. First, what I'm saying is that formal logic is HOPELESS at modelling human thought, and this is shown through Goedel's incompleteness theory alone if not anything else. Because of that, no, it is NOT an absolute truth. In fact, in failing to approximate and justify itself, IT STRIPS ITSELF OF ANY CROWN THAT IT HAS AS 'ABSOLUTE TRUTH'. Please read what I'm bothering to say before you give me this shit. Secondly, racism is at best for its case as unjustifiable as anything else. The key refutation against it is that we have a commons of reason which is not determined (at the very least, in full) by biology. Racism at its current height is scientific ideology which is argued in favour of using empirical data and models which compute this data and bind it to qualities.
Explain which non-rational processes are causes for the reasoning behind racism in all its inapproximable horror. Hint: dialectics.org
Owen Sanders
is a continuation of , meant for . Also take PDF related.